Building AIs that do human-like philosophy

Podcast version (read by the author) here, or search for “Joe Carlsmith Audio” on your podcast app

This is the ninth essay in a series I’m calling “How do we solve the alignment problem?”. I’m hoping that the individual essays can be read fairly well on their own, but see this introduction for a summary of the essays that have been released thus far, plus a bit more about the series as a whole.

1. Introduction

At this point in the series, I’ve outlined most of my current picture of what it would look like to build a mature science of AI alignment. But I left off one particular topic that I think worth discussing on its own: namely, the importance of building AIs that do what I’ll call “human-like philosophy.”

I want to discuss this topic on its own because I think that the discourse about AI alignment is often haunted by some sense that AI alignment is not, merely, a “scientific” problem. Rather: it’s also, in part, a philosophical (and perhaps especially, an ethical) problem; that it’s hard, at least in part, because philosophy is hard; and that solving it is likely to require some very sophisticated philosophical achievement.

There are a lot of different versions of this thought. And part of my aim in this essay is to clarify which versions I do and don’t accept. In my last essay, I discussed a version that I don’t accept – namely, that we need to be building AIs that we trust to become dictators-of-the-universe, and whose motivations-on-reflection therefore need to be “exactly right.” And below I’ll mention a few other versions that I don’t accept as well.

I’ve also previously discussed a version of “philosophy is important to AI alignment” that I do accept – namely, the claim that success at AI alignment may require lots of “conceptual research” in a broad sense, i.e. research that can’t be easily evaluated via empirical feedback loops or formal methods. But philosophy in the sense I have in mind in this essay is a narrower domain than “conceptual research.” And I’m especially interested, here, in a more specific claim about the role of philosophy in particular in AI alignment – one that I also accept, and which I think suggests some important lines of research.

Here, the basic thought that is philosophy is closely connected to out-of-distribution generalization. That is, philosophy is core to how we decide how to extend our concepts and practices to new contexts – and AIs will have to do a lot of this. Insofar as we want our AIs to generalize out of distribution in suitably good (read: safe and well-elicited) ways, then:

Capability: they need to be suitably good at the sort of philosophy humans would endorse on reflection (this is what I call “human-like philosophy”¹), and
Disposition: they need to be suitably disposed to actually do that sort of philosophy in particular.

How hard is this challenge? Well, we probably get Capability by default, eventually, out of suitably advanced AIs² (though, getting it earlier rather than later might be important). So I think Disposition should be our biggest concern. And Disposition is, in effect, just another elicitation problem – and in particular, it’s a version of the problem of eliciting suitably high-quality “conceptual research” from AIs capable of such research. So I don’t see this challenge as structurally different from others I’ve already discussed.

But it still might be harder. For example, insofar as human-like philosophy (and especially: ethics) is especially difficult to evaluate even relative to other sorts of conceptual research, and/or especially specific-to-humans rather than objectively correct, this may be an area where we need especially careful effort. I say a little bit below about what I think this sort of effort might look like. But I’m also hoping that this essay can help prompt further attention to the topic.

I work at Anthropic, but I am here speaking only for myself and not for my employer, and Anthropic comms hasn’t reviewed this post. Thanks especially to Peter Favaloro, Ben Levinstein, David Lorell, and John Wentworth for discussion.

2. Philosophy as a tool for out-of-distribution generalization

What do philosophers do? Well, lots of things.³ One thing, though, is to attempt to analyze and systematize our understanding of various human concepts in a manner that allows us to clarify how they apply to various cases, including unusual cases we might not normally consider. Thus, for example, a philosopher might propose an analysis of a concept like “knowledge” (e.g. “justified true belief”) and then test how it applies to e.g. a Gettier case. Or a philosopher might propose a theory of right action (e.g. “maximize net pleasure”), and then test what it says to do in e.g. a trolley problem.

This process typically involves some back-and-forth between our intuitive judgments about how a concept like “knowledge” or “morality” applies to a given case, and the more explicit and systematized analysis that the philosopher has proposed. Typically, intuitions are given substantive but finite amounts of weight, such that they can be revised/discarded if necessary; and considerations other than fit with intuitions (for example, the parsimony and intuitive appeal of the higher-level principles themselves) can play a role as well. The hope is to eventually reach a “reflective equilibrium” that best harmonizes one’s intuitions and one’s higher level analysis/understanding – though philosophers can still differ, here, in which form of harmonization they ultimately end up endorsing.

Why might this practice be relevant to AI alignment? Well, one reason is that it looks a lot like an attempt to grapple with issues related to out-of-distribution generalization. That is, our intuitions and existing practices give us some initial grounding with respect to the application of a concept to some limited range of cases, analogous to the “distribution” we’ve been given “training data” for – but as we extend to other less-familiar cases, we become less sure how the concept applies, and it becomes less clear that a particular sort of application will be consistent with the others in the manner we want (and the relevant standards of consistency can themselves be up-for-grabs).⁴ Good philosophy is supposed to help in this respect – albeit, sometimes in ways that require revising our existing practices in addition to extending them (e.g., maybe you thought eating meat was OK, but you later decide it’s wrong).

What’s more, out-of-distribution generalization plays at least some key role in AI alignment.

At the least, as I discussed in “Giving AIs safe motivations,” success at motivation control requires successful generalization from safe inputs to dangerous inputs on the first safety-critical try.
What’s more, a world transformed by AI will likely be very different than ours in many ways; we will need to figure out how to extend our concepts and practices to such a world; and we will likely want AI help in doing this.
Finally, to the extent that we want AIs themselves to be structuring their decision-making using human-like concepts or something nearby (e.g. “helpful,” “harmless,” “honest,” etc), these AIs will likely be facing decisions that are themselves very different from the sorts of decisions that humans are used to making (for example, because AIs have so much more information and capability than we do), and we want them to extend the relevant human concepts to those decisions in a manner we would endorse – including in circumstances where they can’t easily ask for human help in doing so (for example, because humans can’t understand the relevant decision; or because the choice about whether/how to ask for human help itself implicates the question at issue).

What’s more, in many cases it seems plausible that (a) there is no objectively correct way to handle the distributional shift in question, (b) we are nevertheless invested in it being done in some ways rather than others, (c) we don’t understand the specific way we want it to be done very well, and (d) the way we want it done is plausibly quite complicated and contingent. Thus, for example, suppose you’re trying to figure out whether it’s morally OK to use pigs for medical experiments. Is there a single correct way of extending our existing moral practices to this case? It’s not clear that there is. Certainly, different value systems can differ in their verdicts in this case. But, more subtly, different ways of extending, refining, and extrapolating the concepts at stake in a given value system might yield different verdicts as well. But we might still be invested in a particular method of extending/refining/extrapolating those concepts – not because it is objectively correct, but because it is, in some sense, “ours.” And we might not have a clear sense of what “our method” is.

This is why I’ve labeled the type of philosophy I’m interested in “human-like” as opposed to just “good” or “correct.” That is: while it’s possible that there is some objectively correct way to do all the philosophy involved in the out-of-distribution generalization necessary for AI alignment, it seems plausible to me that at least some substantive component of this philosophy (for example, the type at stake in ethics) is quite contingent to humans. And if so, this means that teaching AIs to be suitably good at philosophy may be less like teaching them to be suitably good at science or math (domains where one might think it more likely that all rational beings will converge on similar practices), and more like acculturating them into particular patterns of reasoning and reflection quite specific to humans in particular.

Of course, once we acknowledge that the sort of philosophy we want AIs to do is dependent on contingencies of human psychology, we might also acknowledge ways in which other contingencies might result in different humans endorsing different sorts of philosophy, even on reflection. This problem is directly analogous to the sense in which a lot of AI alignment talks about “our values” or “human values” or some such, as though there is some privileged point of consensus in this respect, despite the fact that there plausibly isn’t. That is, just as humans may have different object-level values, it may be that different humans would refine/extrapolate/reflect on those values in different ways. But, as ever in the context of the alignment problem, to the extent different humans wish to “steer” an AI in different directions, the relevant project will become relativized to that direction in particular – but many of the structural dynamics at stake in the discussion will hold constant. Or to put the point another way: “whose version of philosophy?” is structurally analogous to “but aligned to whom?”. And in both cases: I’m not taking a strong stand (or at least, not beyond the assumption, in both cases, that the relevant “who” is a human or a set of humans).

3. Some limits to the importance of philosophy to AI alignment

All this suggests, then, that it might be important to AI alignment that AIs do human-like philosophy well, and also that it might be at least somewhat finicky to get right. Before going further with this thought, though, I want to note some ways I think it’s possible to take it too far – ways that I think some parts of the discourse about AI alignment sometimes fall prey to.

I discussed one version of this in my last essay, in the context of the idea of building “sovereign AIs” that we trust to reflect, self-improve, and alter themselves to unbounded degrees, and then to optimize extremely hard for the values that result from that process. Depending on various questions about “value fragility” and related forms of fragility, building AIs that you trust to that degree may require especially extreme degrees of success at making them disposed to do human-like philosophy (and potentially, from extremely human-like starting-points). But I don’t think AIs like this should be our focus. Rather, to a first approximation, I think we should be focused on building AIs that follow our instructions, which don’t go rogue, and which can suitably fuel and strengthen the processes in civilization that can help us most in eventually creating a wonderful future – including the processes at stake in handling future issues related to AI alignment, philosophy, and so on.

Relatedly: some of the early discourse about AI alignment sometimes implied that any concept at stake in an AI’s motivations/instructions needed to be robust to extreme degrees of optimization – and therefore, perhaps, defined/implemented with suitably extreme degrees of precision and accuracy. Thus, for example, Yudkowsky describes how we wouldn’t even be able to build a paperclip maximizer if we tried, because its optimization would inevitably drive towards “boundary cases” of paperclips that it would classify differently than we do; and if we tried to get it to ask us whether a given object is a paperclip and see if we say yes, we would get the same problem with boundary cases of concepts like “Ask,” “Us,” and “Say Yes.” And in some sense, this broad category of problem is indeed core to my concern in this essay. But as I discussed in my last essay, just as I don’t think we need to build sovereign AIs whose values are robust to arbitrary degrees of optimization, I also don’t think that the values and instructions at stake in in building safe, instruction-following AIs need to be robust to arbitrary degrees of optimization power, either. Rather, they only need to be robust to the actual degree of optimization power that the AI at a specific relevant level of capability will actually apply to the concept in question. And I expect that if the relevant concepts aren’t being “maximized” – e.g., if an AI regulates its behavior via a concept of “honesty” without trying to be maximally honest – this can help as well, since maximization seems especially likely to drive concepts towards weird edge cases (though: “nearest unblocked neighbor” problems can create their own edge-case problems as well).⁵

More broadly, sometimes when people argue about the importance of philosophy to AI alignment, they point to all of the philosophical questions that a good future requires getting right – e.g., questions about moral patienthood, consciousness, decision-theory, meta-ethics, and so on. And to be clear: I agree that these questions are very important, that a good future likely needs to get them right, that we need early superintelligences to play the right sort of role in putting us on a path to such a future, and that doing suitably human-like philosophy likely plays some role in that. But I think this is very different both from needing to solve those issues now, and from needing to “meta-solve” them in the sense of: be confident about what it looks like to solve them or what procedure we would follow to do so, even if we haven’t done it. We need to take the next few steps well, but we don’t need to know the full path, or where it leads. This, indeed, has always been our situation – and I don’t think the advent of transformative AI changes that. Indeed, I think that certain strains in the alignment discourse have generally been too willing to equate “solving the alignment problem” with “solving the whole future ahead of time, albeit indirectly” – i.e., performing some AI-related action (installing a perfect dictator?) such that we now know the future will be good. I think this goal is importantly too broad, and likely to lead to the wrong sorts of standards in thinking about what needs to get done.

I also think that it’s important to distinguish between the role of philosophy in ensuring adequate safety (i.e., AIs that don’t go problematically rogue) vs. adequate elicitation (i.e., AIs that otherwise perform tasks in desirable ways). Rogue behavior, in my opinion, is generally a much higher-stakes problem than other sorts of undesirable task-performance, because sufficiently successful rogue behavior results in irrecoverable catastrophe. But many of the most problematic forms of rogue behavior – i.e. killing all humans, self-exfiltrating, lying about your motives, etc – don’t require especially sophisticated philosophy in order to classify as undesirable. And while it’s true that various forms of capability elicitation will implicate philosophical questions, in many cases these questions don’t have existential stakes. And in many cases, where non-rogue AIs are genuinely unsure about how to handle a given philosophical issue, they might well be able to just ask us.

Indeed, in thinking about the role of philosophical questions in AI alignment, I think it’s important to bear in mind the many ways in which the stakes of philosophy can be less than existential. For example, it can often happen that as it becomes less clear how to extend a concept to cover a given “edge case,” the question also starts to feel itself less stakes-y – perhaps because there isn’t an answer, or perhaps because insofar as there is an answer, the features that made it an edge case also make it less important. Thus, if you value “life,” and you encounter an edge case of “life” like a self-replicating cellular automata, it may be that there isn’t an answer about whether this cellular automata is alive, and thus you should be correspondingly less invested in it; or even if it ultimately counts “alive,” the features that made it more of an edge case should also give it less of the value at stake for you in more paradigm forms of life.

Even beyond edge cases, though: sometimes, we get a philosophical issue wrong, but life goes on. Indeed: plausibly, we are doing tons and tons of this, all the time. This can range from obviously trivial cases (“Is a hot dog a sandwich?”) to everyday ethical choices (“Was that dishonest?”) to hotly debated political topics (“Is a fetus a person?”). This will be true after transformative AI as well – e.g., AIs will get philosophical questions wrong, they’ll cause us to get them wrong, and so on. And these mistakes can be quite costly. But they’re only existentially costly if they lead us, more permanently, down the wrong path.

4. When is philosophy existential?

When might superintelligences doing philosophy in the wrong way lead us more permanently down the wrong path? One salient example, to me, is the concept of “manipulation.” Thus:

It seems plausible to me that there is something about the difference between being manipulated vs. not manipulated that we do, in fact, care about a lot on reflection, and with existential stakes – such that, e.g., if humans ended up systematically manipulated by AIs, this would be an existential catastrophe.
I think that our current philosophical understanding of which modes of interacting with someone are problematically manipulative vs. suitably autonomy-respecting is quite under-developed. And while certain cases (e.g. direct brainwashing) are obvious, many (e.g., emotional rhetoric) are not.
I think that highly capable AIs interacting with un-aided humans, and who are invested in not being manipulative, will likely have to deal constantly with dilemmas about manipulation that are seriously out of distribution relative to our familiar human practices. In particular, these AIs will quickly be radically empowered, relative to humans, in their ability to predict and control how humans respond to what they say and do – much more-so than e.g. human parents relative to children, teachers relative to students, advertisers relative to consumers, and so on.
In many cases, I think these AIs may not be able to “just ask the humans” what sorts of conduct count as problematically manipulative or not. In particular:
- Many of the relevant cases may be too sophisticated for humans to understand. I.e., maybe a superintelligence is deciding whether some crazy form of interaction with a million different bots via some highly complex data structure counts as problematically manipulative, but it can’t explain the situation to a human.
- It may be that even if humans could understand and give guidance for the relevant case, in practice the AI can’t get the relevant form of input – for example, there isn’t enough time.
- It may be that the very act of explaining the situation to the human would itself implicate some of the questions about manipulation that are at issue. I.e., the AI can tell that if it presented the question in manner X, then the human would give answer A, but if the AI presented the question in manner Y, the human would give answer B, and so on.

So, manipulation seems to me like a case where even fairly minimal forms of safety and elicitation require that superintelligent AIs be both capable and disposed to extend our concepts and ethical practices in ways we would endorse, including to cases that we can’t understand.

I also think there are likely to be a variety of other examples like this. For example:

I think that questions about AI “honesty” may well implicate problems similar to manipulation.
I think we may want AIs to make decisions about policy, ethics, and so on in many contexts that humans can’t easily understand or weigh in on. If wrong answers to some of these questions get effectively “locked in,” or if the answers go sufficiently uncorrected over time, or if good policy decisions depend on at least having reasonable credences over different positions but AIs don’t, then this could be existentially catastrophic. Here early decision-making about the dynamics of space colonization or post-AGI global governance could be examples of the sorts of contexts that implicate issues like this.
There are some issues (e.g., decision theory) where it seems plausible that if AIs approach these issues in the wrong way, this could have catastrophic effects in the context of the dynamics at stake in different forms of conflict, negotiation, and so on.
More generally, to the extent a central use-case for safe, superintelligent AIs is to help our civilization become “wiser,” it seems unsurprising if it turns out to be important – and even, existentially important – that superintelligences be themselves “actually wise.” And while philosophy is certainly not the only component of wisdom, I expect it has a role to play.

So overall, despite the limitations on the role of philosophy in AI alignment that I discussed above, I do think it’s nevertheless important that our AIs do philosophy in the ways we’d endorse.

5. The challenge of human-like philosophy

How hard is it, then, to build advanced AIs that do philosophy in suitably human-like ways?

5.1 The relationship between human-like philosophy and human-like motivations

One question here is about the interaction between this challenge and the challenge of building AIs with human-like motivations – a challenge I discussed in my last essay, which argued that some degree of alien-ness in AI motivations is compatible with safe instruction-following. And indeed, just as I don’t think AI motivations need to be exactly human-like (or “exactly right” in other respects) in order to be safe, I also don’t think that the way AIs reflect on, refine, or extrapolate their motivations needs to be exactly human-like or exactly-right either. Rather, as ever, the combination of starting-point + extrapolation just needs to add up to suitably safe behavior on the inputs that matter in practice. Thus, just as two humans with slightly different concepts + philosophies of honesty can end up suitably honest in the cases-that-count, so too can an AI motivated by a somewhat inhuman (but still heavily overlapping-with-human) conception of honesty (“schmonesty”), and using a somewhat inhuman manner of extending/refining that this concept (“schmilosophy”), might still end up suitably honest on the cases that count (even the out of distribution cases), even if it wouldn’t be suitably honest-according-to-us in all cases.

That said, I do think that the cases where doing human-like philosophy right matters most also tend to be the cases where the human-like-ness of the starting points tends to matter a lot as well. This is roughly because these tend to be the “edge cases” that require more finicky and subtle applications of the relevant concept, and which therefore suggest a need for higher standards of overlap, both in the initial starting-point concept (e.g. “honesty” vs. “schmonesty”) and the manner of extending/refining it (e.g. “philosophy” vs. “schmilosophy”). And more generally, in many cases the line between starting point and extrapolation-method isn’t especially clean (e.g., it’s not always clear whether two philosophers who differ in their reflective applications of a concept differ in the concept they started with, or in their methods of refining/extrapolating that concept, or both).

In this sense, the cases where human-like philosophy matters a lot also serve as an important caveat to some of my comments about alien-ness in AIs in my previous essay. That is: in cases where even classifying whether a given form of out-of-distribution generalization is correct or incorrect requires sophisticated forms of philosophical reflection, but where getting the generalization right nevertheless has existential stakes, then I do think it will often by the case that the standards of human-like-ness at stake in the AIs we are trusting with such generalization go up quite substantially, since more subtleties of our concepts and practices seem likely to become relevant.

That said, as I discussed above, I do think that the most paradigmatic examples of rogue behavior (e.g., what Karnofsky calls “Pretty Obviously Unintended and Dangerous Behavior”) aren’t like this.⁶ And this suggests, at least, a possible ordering of operations in eventually building AIs that we trust to handle sensitive, finicky forms of philosophical generalization. That is: first, build AIs that don’t go rogue, and that help us with tasks that don’t require that these AIs satisfy very exacting standards of human-like-ness in their motivations and philosophies (I think that what I previously called “empirical alignment research” falls into this bucket; but more controversially, I actually think that a lot of “conceptual research” – e.g., building robust safety-cases for novel forms of AI development and deployment – does too). Then, to the extent it’s true that more exacting standards of human-like-ness are required to handle certain areas, use those AIs to help you figure out how to approach that problem (e.g., by trying to build AIs that meet the relevant human-like-ness standards; by aiming for whole brain emulation or other forms of access to more enhanced human cognition; or by trying to find a way to draw centrally on more standard forms of human cognition and decision-making in approaching the relevant issues).

Unfortunately, though, even if it works to punt some of the sensitive philosophical issues I’ve discussed above – e.g., policy-making around space colonization – until we have access to AIs that we can use to make tons of progress on human-like-ness in AI motivations, I do worry that certain other issues – notably, manipulation – are more urgent. That is: plausibly, most of the advanced AIs we interact with even in the context of doing further alignment research, whole brain emulation research, etc are going to be in a position to manipulate us if they see fit. So by the time we’re using such AIs, we need them to not be manipulating us in existentially catastrophic ways. If this requires both that they are motivated by an extremely human-like concept of non-manipulation, and that they are disposed to refine and extrapolate that concept in human-like ways, then ongoing alien-ness in one or both of these respects is indeed a serious problem.⁷

5.2 How hard is human-like philosophy itself?

Even beyond its connection to human-like motivations, though, how hard is the challenge of causing AIs to do human-like philosophy itself? As discussed in the introduction, I think we can break this challenge down into two components:

Capability: creating AIs that are suitably good at the sort of philosophy humans would endorse on reflection.
Disposition: creating AIs that are suitably disposed to actually do that sort of philosophy in particular, as opposed to some other kind.

Let’s take these two in turn.

5.2.1 Capability

How hard is it to build advanced AIs that are at least capable of doing human-like philosophy? The traditional answer, in AI alignment, is that this part, at least, is not so hard. After all: by hypothesis, AIs that are better at humans across the board will be better at human-like philosophy. Thus, for example, a superintelligence faced with some dilemma about manipulation will be in a position to know how humans would extend their ethics to this sort of the case – the problem, the story goes, is that it won’t care. In this sense, on the standard AI alignment picture, Disposition is the main game.

I’m broadly sympathetic to focusing on Disposition for this reason. I’ll note, though, that insofar as the timing of when AI philosophical capability becomes available matters (e.g., because we care about forms of alignment in earlier, pre-superintelligent systems that we are using for safety-relevant work), then how much we invest in teaching AIs the capabilities at stake in human-like philosophy might matter quite a bit as well. Here there are parallels with the sort of capabilities at stake in AI alignment research more broadly. Maybe you get such capabilities eventually; but you might want them soon, and (especially in regimes where capability generalization does less work, and you need more specialized forms of data and shlep), they might be especially finicky to develop.

5.2.2 Disposition

What about disposition? This, I think, is the main challenge: granted that an AI knows how to do philosophy in human-like ways, how do we ensure that it actually does philosophy in those ways in particular, as opposed to some other way?

Here, my current take is that this is mostly a variant on the broad challenge at stake in eliciting good conceptual research from AIs – a challenge I discussed at length in my essay on automating alignment research. In this sense, I think, the challenge at stake in eliciting human-like philosophy seems to me quite continuous with the other issues I’ve discussed in the series already. Is there some reason it might be uniquely challenging?

One story you might tell here is that relative to human-like philosophy, other forms of conceptual research are more likely either to have “objectively correct” (or at least, quite privileged and natural) answers for how to do them, even if they raise some similar issues with evaluation. Thus, for example, maybe you grant that the type of conceptual research at stake in constructing safety cases for novel forms of AI development is difficult to evaluate due to difficulties iterating empirically. Plausibly, though, different alien species would converge on similar practices in this respect, since there is ultimately an objective answer (or, some limited set of objectively good answers) as to how to reason conceptually in ways that result in good predictions about the safety of novel technologies. And perhaps one might say something similar about some of the other intellectual domains I labeled as “conceptual” in my previous essay – e.g., futurism and political discourse.

It’s not totally clear to me why exactly this difference would make eliciting the relevant capability harder, but one can imagine stories. E.g., perhaps you say that because there is an objectively correct/privileged/natural way of doing these other forms of conceptual thinking, the right way is more likely to get trained into the AI’s reasoning and dispositions by default in other contexts, or to stand out as a privileged point of focus as the AI tries to orient explicitly towards this domain; whereas this won’t be as true in the context of philosophy, and especially not the more ethically-inflected aspects of philosophy. Here, I do think we start to run into questions about exactly how contingent/unnatural/non-privileged various patterns of human-like philosophical reasoning are, including in the context of ethics.⁸ But I can see some argument for unique concern.

Relatedly, you might think that philosophy is actually uniquely difficult to evaluate even relative to these other conceptual domains, because it’s even more non-empirical. Thus, the other domains I’ve discussed as conceptual – e.g., futurism, political discourse, safety cases for novel deployments – are centrally difficult to evaluate empirically because the relevant empirical data is hard to get at the time you’re conducting the evaluation (e.g., you can’t empirically evaluate AI 2027’s predictions easily in 2025; you can’t empirically evaluate an argument that GPT-7 won’t kill everyone without seeing if it does, etc). But this makes it easier to find work-arounds that help you evaluate similar sorts of claims in other contexts – e.g., collecting and grading shorter-run or longer-ago forecasts, examining the validity of various safety-cases for lower-stakes deployments, etc. Whereas in philosophy, and especially in ethics, you never get any empirical feedback of this kind. Yes, you can learn how philosophical/ethical thinking changes over time, and where different points of consensus form, but it’s a different question whether those points of consensus (if they’re available) are right, and they feel much less like “ground truth.”

So overall, I do think that eliciting human-like philosophy even from AIs capable of it may pose unique challenges even relative to other forms of conceptual research, especially as we start to move into domains and capability levels that are more difficult for humans to evaluate (i.e., “superhuman human-like philosophy”). What might working on this topic look like?

6. What does working on this look like?

Even if training for and eliciting human-like philosophy turns out to be uniquely difficult even relative to other forms of conceptual research, though, I think that much of the basic toolkit looks pretty similar. Thus:

Top-human-level examples. One clear baseline here is to work to collect and train on high-quality examples of human-like philosophy, including in the contexts where we’re most concerned for AIs to get it right (e.g., manipulation). Here, I think, we should be especially interested in examples of philosophical reasoning occurring “in practice” – i.e., an agent encountering live a context in which it needs to extend some concept, principle, or ethical framework to some new case – rather than e.g. the sort of broader theoretical argument at stake in most academic papers.
Associated capabilities. Philosophy draws on tons of other closely related capabilities that aren’t unique to philosophy in particular. The sorts of capabilities at stake in logic and mathematics are one especially salient example, but other capabilities are relevant as well – for example, the sort of broad analytic reasoning abilities at stake in e.g. law, the sort of calibration and humility at stake in e.g. good forecasting, the sort of creativity at stake in good science and art, the sort of linguistic and narrative sensitivity at stake in poetry and literature, and so on. So training and elicitation related to these other domains is plausibly quite relevant as well.⁹
Top-human-level evaluation. Even beyond top-human-level examples of philosophy and related capabilities, we also want to take advantage of the “generation vs. evaluation gap,” and to try to get to a point where we’re at least drawing on top-human-level ability to evaluate philosophical reasoning, even if humans could not have produced that reasoning themselves.
Scalable oversight. The next step, though, is to go beyond even top-human-level abilities to evaluate philosophy, and to start creating genuinely superhuman evaluation signals via various techniques for scalable oversight (see my discussion of these various techniques here).
Behavioral science of generalization. Using whatever evaluation signals we have available (whether merely top-human-level or superhuman), we should also be studying the generalization dynamics at stake in AIs doing philosophical reasoning. For example, to the extent we’re interested in how AIs approach attempts to reach “reflective equilibrium” about their ethical and philosophical frameworks, we should give them the chance to engage in relevant forms of reflection – and perhaps, as well, in relevant forms of self-modification, provided that it occurs with a safely contained context – and to see what we learn. Indeed, throughout this series (e.g. here and here) I’ve tried to emphasize just how much experimental juice is available in the context of the behavioral science of generalization, and I think those considerations apply here as well.
Transparency. Various transparency tools can help us with what I previously called “process-focused evaluation” – i.e., improving our ability to evaluate whether AIs are engaging in philosophical reasoning in ways we trust, even without looking at or focusing on the output itself. And transparency tools can help us more broadly in trying to understand what’s going on with our AIs, including with respect to the baseline degrees of “human-like-ness” they are likely to display.
Getting AI help with all of the above. Finally, as I’ve emphasized throughout the series, we should be trying to get AI help in all of the above. In particular, in the essay on automated alignment research I suggested that success at automating more empirical forms of alignment research can lead to a glut of progress in learning how to better evaluate conceptual research as well, both via more output-focused forms of evaluation (e.g., better techniques for scalable oversight), and via more process-focused forms of evaluation (e.g., improved behavioral science of generalization, and improved forms of transparency) – and that automated empirical research can help us a lot with detecting and eliminating scheming as well. I think most of this discussion applies to efforts to suitably elicit human-like philosophy from AIs as well.

Overall, then, while building AIs that do human-like philosophy could prove an especially subtle and hard-to-evaluate challenge, even relative to other forms of hard-to-evaluate reasoning, I think we have a variety of angles of attack available, and that we’re in a position, now, to make real progress. I hope that this essay can help spur effort in this respect.